On July 10, 2011, about 1115 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-161, N9202C, registered to the Euro American School of Aviation Inc (EASA)., was substantially damaged during a forced landing after a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from the Ormond Beach Municipal Airport (OMN), Ormond Beach, Florida. The flight instructor and student pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight that originated at 1030 from OMN.

On July 10, 2011, about 1115 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-161, N9202C, registered to the Euro American School of Aviation Inc (EASA)., was substantially damaged during a forced landing after a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from the Ormond Beach Municipal Airport (OMN), Ormond Beach, Florida. The flight instructor and student pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight that originated at 1030 from OMN.

The flight originated about 45 minutes prior to the accident from OMN, at which time the flight instructor and student pilot flew in the local area to practice flight maneuvers. The flight then returned to OMN to practice takeoffs and landings on runway 26. After the flight's second takeoff, the Ormond Beach Tower Control lost sight of the airplane. The airplane first collided with trees in a wooded area approximately 150 feet beyond the departure end of runway 26. The wreckage came to rest on the ground just south of the extended runway centerline with its nose perpendicular to the centerline. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and wings.

In a written statement, the flight instructor reported that the flight was his second of the day in N9202C. He stated that the student pilot was new to the flight school and this was his first flight in the USA. The student had about 26 hours of previous flight training in the United Kingdom. During the preflight, the instructor said that he verified the amount of fuel and talked about the differences between the airplanes the student had previously flown and the PA-28. The instructor reported that there was at least 12 gallons of 100LL fuel per tank equaling a total of 24 gallons. He stated that based on his experience with the aircraft, 24 gallons should have been sufficient for 3 hours of training flight at a fuel consumption of 8 gallons per hour.

The instructor stated that since the flight was the student's first in the PA-28 and also his first in the USA, the startup process and taxi took longer than usual. He said that it took a minimum of 0.2 hours until they were ready to go through the power check checklist, which included switching fuel tanks. After takeoff, the airplane was flown to a local practice area to perform routine training maneuvers, then returned to the airport for touch and go practice landings and takeoffs. The instructor performed the first touch and go to show the student the procedures used at the flight school. On the second touch and go takeoff which was flown by the student, the engine lost power after climbing to about 200 feet AGL. The instructor took the flight controls and realized that the airplane was too low to reach a safe landing area.

The instructor stated that about 40 minutes after the accident, a thunderstorm passed through the area and contaminated the accident site.

The NTSB did not travel to the accident site. On site examination of the airplane and engine was done by an FAA inspector, and his findings were relayed to the NTSB during a telephone interview.

There was no indication or evidence that the propeller was being driven by power prior to impact. Both fuel tanks were found compromised and void of fuel. A visual inspection of the aircraft controls indicated that the primer knob was stowed and the throttle was in the full forward position. The fuel selector knob was found in the left tank position. The electric fuel pump was found in the “ON” position, and the fuel mixture knob was found in a normal range for flight.

Inspection of the firewall mounted fuel filter screen revealed that it was clean and free of obstruction. About one table spoon of fuel was detected in the bottom of the fuel bowl. No fuel was found in the carburetor bowl and the throttle linkage to the carburetor showed no signs of damage. When the carburetor jet was activated, it operated normally. The main fuel line that extended from the fuel tanks to the mechanical fuel pump was void of fuel when it was disconnected from the pump at the fuel pump fitting. Activation of the mechanical fuel pump lever indicated that the diaphragm was intact and operational, with no signs of damage or binding. No fuel was detected in the fuel pump bowl.

Removal of the valve covers, and rotation of the propeller forward and aft resulted in the intake and exhaust valves opened and closed respectively. The left magneto was removed from the engine and checked for a short to ground. The unit showed no evidence of damage or internal failures. The right magneto could not be removed for inspection.

A review of EASA flight logs indicated that on the day of the accident, the airplane was flown on the first flight about 1.5 hours. The airplane crashed about 1.2 hours into the second flight. The log also indicated that the airplane was not refueled between flights. It was not possible to verify the aircraft fuel system quantity prior to the first flight on the day of the accident. However, a refueling slip for the airplane showed that the aircraft was last refueled on the day prior to the accident with about 26 gallons. According to the airplane's operating handbook, the total fuel capacity is 48 usable gallons (26 gallons per tank). Daily flight records for the airplane indicated that three different pilots flew the airplane for about 4.8 hours without evidence of refueling before it crashed.

The instructor pilot stated that there was about 12 gallons of fuel in each wing tank prior to the accident flight. According to performance charts in the airplane's operating handbook, best economy mixture settings would burn about 8.5 gallons per gallons per hour (GPH) which translates to about 1.4 hours of flight time for 12 gallons. The preflight ground checks of 0.2 hours and flight time of 1.2 hours would equate to about 1.4 hours of fuel burn for the accident flight. Both the instructor pilot and student pilot stated that the fuel selector was in the right tank position throughout the flight and was not switched to the left tank.

The flight instructor and student pilot of the Cessna 152 found water in the fuel tanks during the preflight inspection. Large amounts of fuel had to be sumped to ensure all the water was removed. Their 1-hour instructional flight was uneventful. They returned to the departing airport, landed and took a short break from flying. They then returned to the airplane to continue the instructional training of touch-and-go landings. The fuel system was not sumped before the second flight. During the initial climb after the first touch-and-go, the engine lost all power about 300 feet above the ground. The flight instructor took over control of the airplane and landed on a golf course fairway, striking trees before coming to a stop. Postcrash examination revealed 6 ounces of water in the gascolator and the right fuel tank cap had indication of leaking and infiltration.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot stated that the flight proceeded to the destination airport and was cleared by air traffic control to land on runway 8. The flight turned from the downwind leg onto base, then onto final approach and with 30-degrees of flaps extended, attempted to maintain 61 knots for the practice short field landing. She began to flare but felt the main landing gear wheels "skid against the pavement" and the airplane then became airborne. She maintained the aft elevator input and again felt the main landing gear wheels skid on the runway and the airplane became airborne again. After the third touchdown the airplane remained on the runway and she taxied to the ramp. According to the NTSB "Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report" form, witness reported seeing a flat approach, contact with the runway, then the airplane porpoised. The recommendations section of the report indicates that a go-around should have been performed upon first indication of a faulty approach.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The airplane was flown by the student and certified flight instructor (CFI) on 2 separate flights lasting a total of approximately 2.8 hours. While taxiing after landing following the second flight, the CFI reportedly advised the student to fill the fuel tanks before flying solo in the traffic pattern. The student reported that while taxiing after landing following the second flight the CFI advised him after looking at the fuel gauges to supply fuel to the engine from the left tank because it had a greater amount of fuel. The airplane was not fueled before the student departed solo and during the initial climb to remain in the traffic pattern, the engine sputtered. The student decreased the angle of attack and engine power was restored; this sequence was reported as occurring 3 times by a witness located on the airport. After the engine lost power a third time, engine power was not restored and the airplane collided with trees, then the ground during a forced landing. Postaccident inspection revealed the fuel selector was found positioned to the left fuel tank which was empty, while the right fuel tank was approximately 1/2 full. The airplane was recovered without removal of the wings and transported to the airport where the engine was started and operated without discrepancies to 1,000 rpm. Concern for internal engine damage precluded operation at a higher rpm. Examination of the fuel gauges revealed that with electrical power applied, the left fuel gauge "pegged full." The left fuel transmitter and left fuel gauge independently tested satisfactory. Examination of the electrical wiring from the left fuel transmitter to the fuel gauge revealed a discrepancy with a connection near the wing root.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The student pilot stated that it was her first unsupervised solo and as she was executing the landing flare/touchdown, the airplane "porpoised", and she was unable to gain control. She said the nose gear collapsed, and the propeller contacted the runway, with the airplane incurring damage to the firewall. Prior to the accident, there were no mechanical failures or malfunctions to the airplane or any of its systems.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The flight instructor stated that the takeoff and initial climb were uneventful, with the engine developing full power, and that during the climb the student pitched up excessively, and the airspeed decayed to near the stall speed. He said he then took control of the aircraft to avert a departure stall, and tried to clear trees at the end of the runway, steering the aircraft toward an area of lower trees, and extending the flaps to forty degrees in an attempt to balloon over the trees, but the left main landing gear became entangled in a tree, and the aircraft crashed incurring substantial damage. An FAA Inspector conducted a postaccident examination of the aircraft and stated that he did not find evidence of any preaccident failures or malfunctions to the aircraft or any of its systems which would have caused the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The student pilot entered the traffic pattern for landing. The pilot flared too high, bounced, and did not add power in an attempt to recover from the bounced landing resulting in the collapse of the nose gear. The student pilot had recorded as logged 8.5 total hours as pilot-in-command.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

13. 9/5/2001 - Euro American School of Aviation aircraft on current registration, formerly Ormond Beach Aviation - student pilot

The student pilot was performing a soft field landing during a supervised solo flight, and she said that during the landing the aircraft bounced. She said she tried to recover by keeping the nose up, and then putting the nose down, but the aircraft bounced three times, and during the third bounce the nose came down, and the aircraft stopped. The flight instructor stated that he had showed the student soft field landings with both 20 and 40 degrees of flaps, and told her to perform them with 20 degrees of flaps, since he felt that she would not be able to handle the airplane with 40 degrees of flaps. The FAA inspector who conducted the postaccident examination of the aircraft said that during the landing, the landing gear failed, and was bent under the aircraft, bringing it to an abrupt halt. As a result, the firewall was damaged, and the forward fuselage wrinkled.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The student said he had some difficulty with the traffic pattern and that during the landing as he started reducing power and initiating the flare, it seemed like it was a high flare, and they hit the runway hard. He said the instructor told him to go around, so he gave the airplane full power and tried to liftoff, but he "blew to the left, and headed off the runway." The instructor stated that she immediately told the student to go around, but as he added power, the airplane headed hard to the left, and did not liftoff. She said she yelled "my controls" but the left wing hit the wind sock. She said she did not know what caused the airplane to turn so severely, and further stated that she taught the student "CRAMB, CLIMB, CLEAN, COMUNICATE," when executing go-arounds, and the "CLEAN" part of the sequence had not been performed, since the climb had not been established. She said that full flaps were still down, and had been down before, during, and after the event. The instructor said that the student has large feet and she had warned him several times about making sure they were far enough back on the floor so that he would not hit the brakes accidentally. A functional check of the aircraft did not identify any preaccident failure or malfunction to the aircraft or any if its systems. The information handbook for the Cessna 172R, Section 4 specifies that the wing flaps must be retracted to 20 degrees immediately after the application of full throttle while executing balked landings.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: